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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates whether credit associations put competitive pressure on regional banks in 
Japanese regional lending markets. It was found that credit associations pressure regional banks to 
set lower lending interest rates in regional markets. In addition, the competitive pressure from credit 
associations in a prefecture whose share of credit associations is more than 20% is much stronger 
than in a prefecture whose share of credit associations is less than 20%. In particular, regional banks 
in a prefecture whose share of credit associations is from 25% to 30% experience the strongest 
pressure. 
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1． Introduction 
In Japan, there are regional banks that are corporations, and cooperative financial institutions that are 
non-profit organizations. Both types of regional financial institutions can have deep roots in local 
communities. The former must seek profit maximization for stock holders. On the other hand, 
because of the nature of their organizations and because they receive privileges from the government, 
the primary objective of the cooperative financial institutions is not to seek profit. Because both 
types undertake the same financial functions, the two different types of financial institutions coexist 
and do businesses in Japanese regional lending markets. 
Furthermore, among cooperative financial institutions some credit associations are equal in size to or 
are larger than regional banks. If such credit associations put competitive pressure on regional banks 
in regional lending markets, privileges granted by the government to credit associations are biased 
against regional banks. When viewed objectively, competitive conditions should be unbiased 
between them. Because many non-Japanese studies have previously examined the competitive 
relationship between banks and non-profit financial institutions, we should clarify the relationships 
between banks and credit associations and consider how to treat credit associations going forward. 
In the present study, we empirically investigate whether the presence of credit associations in 
regional lending markets pressures regional banks to set low lending interest rates in Japan. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, previous studies that analyzed the 
competitive relationships between banks and non-profit financial institutions are surveyed. In 
Section 3, theoretical frameworks are shown and empirical models and data are explained. In Section 
4, empirical results are interpreted. The final section provides summary and conclusions. 
 
2． Literature Review 
Emmons and Schmid (2000) investigated whether banks and credit unions compete in a regional 
deposit market by using country level data in the US. They concluded that these are competitive 
relationships. Tokle and Tokle (2000) analyzed whether banks compete with savings and loans 
(S&Ls) and credit unions by using banks deposit rates in Idaho. They found that banks compete with 
these institutions, and that the competition with credit unions was more severe than with S&Ls. 
Feinberg (2001) examined the effects of credit unions on banks by using the data for local lending 
markets in the US. This study showed that banks in a region whose share of credit unions is higher 
set lower lending rates. Feinberg and Rahman (2001) analyzed the competitive relationship between 
banks and credit unions using a Granger-causality test. They demonstrated that the both credit union 
and bank loan rates are found to cause the other. Feinberg (2003) investigated the determinants of 
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bank lending rates by using both market data and bank data. This study revealed that the presence of 
credit unions negatively affects bank lending rates. 
Hannan (2003) examined the competitive impacts of credit unions on banks and thrift institutions in 
regional deposit markets, and demonstrated that the presence of credit unions positively affects bank 
and thrift deposit rates. Schmid (2005) analyzed whether the share of credit unions in a regional 
market affects deposit market concentrations. This study showed that although those tendencies had 
been found from 1990 to 2000, they have not been seen since 2001. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) 
investigated competitive relationships among multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrift 
institutions in deposit markets of the US. They found that competition among the same types of 
financial institutions is greater than those among different types, and that in most cases thrifts appear 
to be competitively distinct from both multimarket banks and single-market banks. 
 
3． Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
In the present study, we use the same theoretical framework as in Feinberg (2001, 2003). In 
imperfect competition models, an increase of fringe suppliers in a market will bring lower prices. 
When we apply this to Japanese regional lending markets, an increase of credit associations as fringe 
suppliers disciplines banks as relative dominants to set lower lending rates. To formalize this, we use 
a modified version of the dominant firm-price leadership model. 
When we assume demand for loans as a homogeneous product, and credit associations acting as 
fringe suppliers, the Lerner Index of banks can be presented as follows1: 
CAshare
tionkConcentraLI
CAshareεη +=      (1) 
Concentration is the index of market concentration and CAshare is the market share of credit 
associations. From equation (1), it can be observed that the larger the share of credit associations in a 
market, the lower the Lerner Index, which, here, is the lending rate of banks. The objective of the 
present study is to empirically investigate whether this tendency is found in Japanese regional 
lending markets. 
In the present study, we define equation (2) by ordinary least squares, based on the theoretical 
frameworks previously mentioned. White diagonal standard errors and covariance are used. The 
sample population comprises regional banks and pooled data from 2005 to 2010. 
                                                  
1 See Feinberg (2001, 2003) for the derivation of equation (1). 
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Interestrateit = c0 + c1 Concentrationit + c2 CAshareit + c3 Marketshareit +  
c4 logDepositit + c5 HoldingDumit + c6 Callratet − 0.25    (2) 
Subscript i refers to bank i and subscript t refers to year t. Interestrate is lending interest rates and is 
calculated by dividing the interests on loans and discounts by loans and bills discounted (average 
balances). 
Concentration is the degree of market concentration in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i 
is located. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a proxy for Concentration. HHI is 
calculated by using the deposit data of first- and second-tier regional banks and credit associations 
whose headquarters are located in the same prefecture as the headquarters of bank i. However, the 
deposit data of the banks and credit associations used to calculate HHI also include deposits gathered 
outside the headquarters prefecture. Furthermore, deposit data of large banks, i.e., city banks and 
trust banks, cannot be used to calculate HHI. Therefore, HHI is not necessarily an accurate measure 
of market concentration. Hence, we also use the deposit share of the largest banks in a prefecture. 
This is calculated by dividing the deposit of the largest bank by the sum of the deposits of large 
banks, first- and second-tier regional banks, and credit associations in a prefecture as a proxy for 
Concentration 2 . If competition in highly concentrated regions is weaker, the coefficient of 
Concentration will take a positive sign. 
CAshare is the market share of credit associations in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i is 
located. The study uses the following as proxies for CAshare: (1) the ratio of deposits held by credit 
associations in a prefecture to the sum of those held by large banks, first- and second-tier regional 
banks, and credit associations in that prefecture; (2) the ratio of branches of credit associations in a 
prefecture to the sum of those of large banks, first- and second-tier regional banks, and credit 
associations in that prefecture; and (3) the ratio of the sum of the members of credit associations 
whose headquarters are located in a prefecture where the headquarters of bank i is located to the 
population over 20 years old in that prefecture. If credit associations pressure regional banks to set 
lower lending rates in regional markets, the coefficient of CAshare will be negative. 
Marketshare is a proxy for the market share of bank i. Specifically, it is calculated by dividing the 
deposit held by bank i in a prefecture where its headquarter is located by the sum of the deposits held 
by large banks, first- and second-tier regional banks, and credit associations in that prefecture. If 
banks with a larger share in a regional market act oligopolisticly, the coefficient of Marketshare will 
be positive. On the other hand, there is a possibility that banks with a larger share in a regional 
market will deal with other banks in a non-oligopolistic fashion because of the good standing, 
                                                  
2 Feinberg (2001, 2003) used top 2 shares in a regional market as a proxy for the degree of market 
concentration. However, we use Top 1 share because there are prefectures that disclose only the top 
1 bank in Japan and thus, samples become smaller by using top 2 shares. 
 5
bargaining power and dealing with enterprises of good standing. If banks with a larger share in a 
regional market set lower risk premiums because of such reasons, it is possible that the coefficient of 
Marketshare will be negative. 
Deposit is the deposit balances of bank i, and is a proxy for scale. If larger banks enjoy economies of 
scale, those banks might return the reduced costs to their customers by setting lower lending rates. If 
so, the coefficient of Deposit will take a negative sign. This variable is converted into a natural 
logarithm. 
HoldingDum is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a bank is affiliated with a bank 
holding company, and takes the value of 0 when a bank is an independent bank. If banks that are 
affiliated with bank holding companies can realize efficiencies, they might reflect these in lending 
rates. If so, the coefficient of HoldingDum will be negative. 
Callrate is the call money rate in the previous quarter. If banks set lending rates to be consistent with 
market rates, the coefficient of Callrate will be positive.  
3.2 Data 
Data for the financial statements of individual banks and credit associations are taken from the 
Nikkei NEEDS. Data absent in Nikkei NEEDS is supplemented from the “Analysis of Financial 
Statements of All Banks,” edited by the Japanese Bankers Association, and “Financial Statements of 
All Credit Associations,” edited by Consultant of Financial Books Co. Ltd. Data on deposit balances 
and branches of individual banks in a prefecture where their headquarters are located, and data of 
prefectural deposit balances and branches, are obtained from the “Financial Map,” edited by Japan 
Financial News Co. Ltd. Data on members of credit associations are quoted from “Financial 
Statements of All Credit Associations.” Data on prefectural population is obtained from the 
“Financial Resources of a Nation” (Minryoku), edited by Asahi Newspaper. Data on call money rates 
are acquired from the homepage of Bank of Japan. 
Descriptive statistics on the data used in the present study are in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
4． Empirical Results 
4.1 Results of the Basic Model 
In this section, we apply equation (2). Table 2 shows the three calculation results, as mentioned in 
section 3: (1) the case where the proportion of deposits held by credit associations in a prefecture is 
taken as a proxy for CAshare, (2) the case where the proportion of branches of credit associations in 
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a prefecture is taken as that proxy, and (3) the case where the proportion of members of credit 
associations in a prefecture is taken as that proxy. 
Table 2. Calculation Result 1 
 
In all of the three cases, the coefficients of CAshare are negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Regional banks located in a prefecture where the shares of credit associations are higher set lower 
lending rates; the presence of credit associations in a regional lending market puts competitive 
pressure on regional banks. 
As a proxy variable of market concentration, the coefficients of HHI are insignificant in all cases; 
however, the coefficient of Top1share in the case of Deposit share is significantly positive at the 5% 
level3. It is impossible to calculate an accurate HHI for Japanese prefectural markets because of the 
limitations on disclosed data. Therefore, if Top1share is more credible than HHI, there is a 
possibility that regional banks in more concentrated markets set oligopolistic lending rates. 
The coefficients of Marketshare are negative and significant at the 1% level in all cases. It therefore 
can be concluded that regional banks with a larger share in a regional market do not act 
oligopolisticly. The possibility that they set lower lending rates because they can raise adequate 
profits or that they are dealing with enterprises of good standing can be inferred. 
The coefficients of Deposit in all calculations take significantly negative values at the 1% level. 
Because larger regional banks can reduce their costs, it can be considered that they still can achieve 
profits with lower lending rates. 
The coefficients of Callrate are significant and positive at the 1% level in all calculations. It can be 
inferred that regional banks set lending rates by considering market rates. 
The study assumes that the presence of credit associations does not influence lending rates to large 
companies set by regional banks because credit associations generally do not lend to large 
companies. In other words, credit associations might put competitive pressure on lending to SMEs 
and individuals by regional banks. We therefore apply equation (2) by assigning lending rates to 
SMEs and individuals to Interestrate. 
The method used to calculate lending rates to SMEs and individuals is as follows. We assign to the 
denominator loans to SMEs and individual customers (average balances) that are disclosed. In 
addition, we regard long-term prime rates as lending rates to large companies, and calculate the 
interest on loans and discounts to large companies by using long-term prime rates (loans and bills 
                                                  
3 We used Top2share instead of Top1share as in Feinberg (2001, 2003) and equation (2). In addition, 
the coefficient of Top2share in the case of Deposit share takes significantly positive values at the 
10% level in those calculations. 
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discounted loans to SMEs and individual customers). Then we regard interest on loans and discounts 
minus interest on loans and discounts to large companies calculated as mentioned before as interest 
on loans and discounts to SMEs and individual customers and place them in the numerator. 
The calculated results using lending rates to SMEs and individuals as Interestrate are in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Calculation Result 2 
 
In addition, the coefficients of CAshare in these calculations take significantly negative values at the 
1% level as in Table 24. We can confirm that the presence of credit associations in a regional lending 
market puts competitive pressure on the setting of lending rates by regional banks even in the case 
that we limit the analysis to the assignment of lending rates to SMEs and individuals. On other 
variables, we find results similar to those in Table 2. 
4.2 Results Using Share Dummies of Credit Associations 
Let us apply equation (2) by using share dummies of credit associations instead of CAshare. 
Specifically, the following are used as independent variables: Dum30, giving 1 to prefectures whose 
deposit shares of credit associations are more than 30%; Dum25, giving 1 to those that are from 25% 
to 30%; Dum20, giving 1 to those that are from 20% to 25%; Dum15, giving 1 to those that are from 
15% to 20%; and Dum10, giving 1 to those that are from 10% to 15%. 
 
Table 4. Calculation Results (The Case that includes CA share Dummy) 
 
Let us first see the results on “Total.” The coefficients of Dum30, Dum25, and Dum20, which are 
over both the average and the median of deposit share of credit associations are under −17%; those 
of Dum15 and Dum10 are greater than −14%. Hence, it can be inferred that regional banks in a 
prefecture whose share of credit associations are more than 20% offer lower lending rates than those 
are under 20%. 
In addition, it is notable that the coefficient of Dum25 is the greatest, that of Dum20 follows it, and 
that of Dum30 is not the greatest among the dummy variables more than Dum20. It can be inferred 
that the competitive pressure of credit associations on setting lending rates by regional banks in a 
                                                  
4 It cannot be denied that structures have largely changed since the period 2005 to 2010. Therefore, 
we also tried cross section calculations by using deposit share of CA as CAshare. Standard errors 
are White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. As was expected, the coefficients of CAshare take 
significantly negative values in all years. 
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prefecture whose share of credit associations is from 25% to 30% is the strongest, and that in a 
prefecture whose share of credit associations is from 20% to 25% is the second strongest.  
The same tendencies can be observed in the calculation results even in the case of lending rates to 
SMEs and individuals. 
 
5． Concluding Remarks 
This paper empirically examined the competitive relationships between regional banks and 
non-profit credit associations in Japanese regional lending markets. 
Through this examination, we first conclude that credit associations put competitive pressure on 
regional banks in regional lending markets. In addition, it is clear that the competitive pressure of 
credit associations in a prefecture whose share of them is more than 20% is much stronger. 
Furthermore, it appears that the competitive pressure of credit associations in a prefecture where 
their share is from 25% to 30% is the strongest, while a share of over 30% does not necessarily 
create the strongest pressure. 
The investigation of competitive relationships among the same types of financial institutions in 
regional lending markets remains for future analysis. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Interestrate SMEs Interestrate Top1share HHI CA Depositshare 
Mean  2.221  2.254  40.585  4005.340  16.953 
Median  2.165  2.208  44.274  4016.699  15.391 
Maximum  4.261  4.669  70.720  27317.090  35.506 
Minimum  1.477  1.400  1.044  598.785  3.800 
Std. Dev.  0.360  0.421  16.859  2050.360  8.295 
Observations  656  656  656  656  656 
 
CA Membershare CA Branchshare Marketshare 
 8.430  32.425  25.425 
 7.240  31.307  18.903 
 22.038  56.649  70.720 
 1.259  9.314  0.400 
 4.250  11.433  19.563 
 656  656  656 
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Table 2. Calculation Result 1 
CAshare Deposit share of CA Branch share of CA Member share of CA 
 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Constant 
4.166*** 
(12.223) 
4.715*** 
(22.938) 
4.274*** 
(12.044) 
4.682*** 
(22.693) 
4.513*** 
(12.360) 
4.889*** 
(23.045) 
Top1share 
0.003** 
(2.035) 
 
0.002 
(1.398) 
 
0.002 
(1.095) 
 
HHI  
0.000 
(0.195) 
 
0.000 
(0.068) 
 
−0.000 
(−0.601) 
CAshare 
−0.011*** 
(−7.034) 
−0.011*** 
(−6.430) 
−0.006*** 
(−6.372) 
−0.006*** 
(−6.251) 
−0.010*** 
(−3.236) 
−0.010*** 
(−3.429) 
Marketshare 
−0.008*** 
(−6.771) 
−0.006*** 
(−7.899) 
−0.008*** 
(−6.310) 
−0.006*** 
(−8.458) 
−0.006*** 
(−5.142) 
−0.005*** 
(−6.941) 
Deposit 
−0.119*** 
(−5.377) 
−0.154*** 
(−10.271) 
−0.124*** 
(−5.356) 
−0.150*** 
(−9.992) 
−0.150*** 
(−6.244) 
−0.173*** 
(−11.348) 
HoldingDum 
0.005 
(0.161) 
0.008 
(0.274) 
0.012 
(0.427) 
0.015 
(0.512) 
−0.008 
(−0.318) 
−0.006 
(−0.235) 
Callrate 
0.190*** 
(3.134) 
0.191*** 
(3.143) 
0.184*** 
(2.953) 
0.185*** 
(2.963) 
0.192*** 
(3.027) 
0.193*** 
(3.039) 
Adjusted-R2 0.438 0.432 0.410 0.407 0.390 0.388 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
Notes1: *Significance at the 10％ level; **Significance at the 5％ level; ***Significance at the 1％ 
level. 
Notes2: White diagonal standard errors and covariance are used. 
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Table 3. Calculation Result 2 
CAshare Deposit share of CA Branch share of CA Member share of CA 
 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Constant 
4.493*** 
(11.748) 
5.159*** 
(21.840) 
4.617*** 
(11.587) 
5.108*** 
(21.478) 
4.918*** 
(12.026) 
5.371*** 
(22.088) 
Top1share 
0.004*** 
(2.584) 
 
0.003* 
(1.857) 
 
0.002 
(1.508) 
 
HHI  
0.000 
(1.373) 
 
0.000 
(1.142) 
 
0.000 
(0.531) 
CAshare 
−0.013*** 
(−7.695) 
−0.013*** 
(−7.011) 
−0.008*** 
(−6.996) 
−0.008*** 
(−6.866) 
−0.012*** 
(−3.541) 
−0.013*** 
(−3.687) 
Marketshare 
−0.010*** 
(−7.189) 
−0.007*** 
(−8.032) 
−0.009*** 
(−6.701) 
−0.007*** 
(−8.504) 
−0.008*** 
(−5.480) 
−0.006*** 
(−7.041) 
Deposit 
−0.135*** 
(−5.420) 
−0.178*** 
(−10.318) 
−0.140*** 
(−5.356) 
−0.172*** 
(−9.861) 
−0.173*** 
(−6.404) 
−0.201*** 
(−11.477) 
HoldingDum 
0.017 
(0.518) 
0.021 
(0.608) 
0.027 
(0.807) 
0.029 
(0.867) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.003 
(0.095) 
Callrate 
0.061 
(0.864) 
0.064 
(0.889) 
0.054 
(0.738) 
0.056 
(0.759) 
0.064 
(0.860) 
0.066 
(0.880) 
Adjusted-R2 0.443 0.434 0.414 0.410 0.390 0.387 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
Notes1: *Significance at the 10％ level; **Significance at the 5％ level; ***Significance at the 1％ 
level. 
Notes2: White diagonal standard errors and covariance are used. 
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Table 4 Calculation Result (The Case that includes CAshare Dummies) 
Interestrate Total SMEs and Individuals 
 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient
(t-value) 
Constant 
5.130*** 
(18.676) 
4.840*** 
(24.701) 
4.832*** 
(13.574) 
5.319*** 
(23.569) 
Top1share 
−0.002 
(−0.014) 
 
0.003** 
(2.212) 
 
HHI  
0.000 
(0.758) 
 
0.000* 
(1.863) 
Marketshare 
−0.000*** 
(−4.159) 
−0.005*** 
(−7.529) 
−0.008*** 
(−6.707) 
−0.007*** 
(−7.672) 
Deposit 
−0.189*** 
(−10.816) 
−0.166*** 
(−11.620) 
−0.161*** 
(−6.895) 
−0.193*** 
(−11.753) 
HoldingDum 
0.018 
(0.547) 
0.005 
(0.140) 
0.019 
(0.518) 
0.019 
(0.505) 
Callrate 
0.174*** 
(2.835) 
0.174*** 
(2.882) 
0.039 
(0.549) 
0.041 
(0.578) 
Dum30 
−0.179*** 
(−2.926) 
−0.201*** 
(−3.267) 
−0.279*** 
(−4.377) 
−0.257*** 
(−3.755) 
Dum25 
−0.329*** 
(−8.448) 
−0.348*** 
(−8.942) 
−0.410*** 
(−9.317) 
−0.415*** 
(−9.222) 
Dum20 
−0.264*** 
(−7.015) 
−0.270*** 
(−7.346) 
−0.331*** 
(−7.371) 
−0.331*** 
(−7.474) 
Dum15 
−0.116*** 
(−4.151) 
−0.118*** 
(−4.213) 
−0.158*** 
(−4.788) 
−0.145*** 
(−4.348) 
Dum10 −0.132*** −0.139*** −0.193*** −0.181*** 
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(−4.195) (−4.387) (−5.205) (−4.859) 
Adjusted-R2 0.433 0.451 0.458 0.454 
Observations 656 656 656 656 
Note1: *Significance at the 10％ level; **Significance at the 5％ level; ***Significance at the 1％ 
level. 
Notes2: White diagonal standard errors and covariance are used. 
Note2: “Total” indicates that Interestrate is calculated by dividing the interest on loans and discount 
by loans and bills discounted (average balances). “SMEs and Individuals” indicates that Interestrate 
is calculated by dividing interests on loans and discounts to SMEs and individual customers by loans 
to SMEs and individual customers (average balances). 
 
